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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since September 11th, 2001, the United States Government 
has faced the ever-evolving challenge of combating foreign terrorists. 
The capture of a suspected terrorist by United States forces presents 
several legal issues, including, questions over the nature of the 
terrorism suspect’s capture, subsequent treatment and afforded 
rights.1   
Additionally, United States Government officials face the 
controversial decision about what to do with captured terrorism 
suspects: either detain them as enemy combatants at Guantanamo 
Bay to face a military tribunal, or try them before a civilian court in 
the United States.2 Since the attacks of September 11th and the 
beginning of the War on Terror, terrorism suspects have been tried in 
military tribunals as well as civilian courts. However, under the 
current administration, the preferred method has been to seek justice 
in civilian courts.3 
Recently, suspected ringleader of the 2012 Benghazi terrorist 
attack,4 Ahmed Abu Khatallah,5 has been subjected to this policy, and 
                                                 
1 See Steve Vladeck, Kidnapping Is Legally Dubious, But It’s Also The Best Way 
To Get Terrorists, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014 (presenting legal issues regarding 
rendition of terrorist suspects). 
2 For arguments promoting both sides in one particular case, see Karen 
DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi Suspect In Secret 
Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014. 
3 See Karen DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi 
Suspect In Secret Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014. 
4 For more information on the Benghazi attack, including background on 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah as well as details of the attack from several witnesses close 
to Abu Khatallah and present on the night of the attack, see David D. Kirkpatrick, 
A Deadly Mix In Benghazi, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi. 
5 While the English spelling of his name sometimes differs based on the 
source, from ‘Khattala’ to ‘Khatallah,’ this comment uses the spelling ‘Khatallah,’ 
which is used in the formal Indictment filed by the United States Attorney’s Office 
for the District of Columbia. See Indictment at 1, United States v. Abu Khatallah, 
No.14-141 (2014). 
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is being tried in a civilian court in Washington D.C.6 Charged in 
relation to the September 11th, 2012, attack on the United States 
diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in which Ambassador J. 
Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Management 
Officer Sean Patrick Smith, and CIA Security Officers Tyrone 
Snowden Woods and Glen Anthony Doherty were killed,7 suspected 
leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Ahmed Abu Khatallah, was captured by a 
team of United States Special Forces in mid-June, 2014.8 After his 
capture in Libya, Ahmed Abu Khatallah was immediately transported 
to an American military vessel, the USS New York, which transported 
Khatallah across the Atlantic Ocean to face trial in federal court in 
the District of Columbia.9  
The capture and subsequent handling of Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah implicates several legal questions surrounding United States 
policy regarding the capture of suspected terrorists.10 Despite 
questions surrounding the handling of Abu Khatallah, the decision by 
the Obama administration to transport Abu Khatallah back to the 
United States on an American military ship was both deliberate and 
strategic.11 By choosing to transport Abu Khatallah by military ship,12 
                                                 
6 See Karen DeYoung and Ann E. Marimow, Benghazi Suspect Ahmed Abu 
Khattala May Be Brought To U.S. On Navy Ship, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014. 
7 See Government’s Motion For Pretrial Detention at 7, United States v. 
Abu Khatallah, No.14-141 (2014). 
8 See Id. at 10. 
9 See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, USS New York, Carrying a Benghazi Suspect, Has 
Gone Dark, WASH. POST, June 25, 2014. 
10 See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror Suspect Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014. 
11 The reasoning for doing so primarily revolves around the rather dubious 
nature of the capture of the suspect by extraordinary rendition. The difficulty in 
finding countries willing to allow suspects who have been subject to rendition to 
pass through their sovereign territory during the process of transporting the 
suspect to America makes transportation by way of military ship extremely 
convenient, if not necessary. See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror 
Suspect Ahmed Abu Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014. 
12 Whether the United States is legally able to use the military for purposes 
of law enforcement is a separate, distinct legal question. Under the Posse Comitatus 
Act, the armed forces are restrained from aiding civilian law enforcement 
authorities in keeping the peace and arresting felons. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1978). 
See also 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1981) (requiring the Department of Defense to prescribe 
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the Obama administration had several days to question and search 
Abu Khatallah before the vessel reached the United States.13 Further, 
because much of the trip from Libya to the United States involved 
crossing the Atlantic Ocean, in international waters, FBI agents were 
able to search Abu Khatallah without a warrant and question him 
without reading him his Miranda rights.14  
This article will argue that the current Administration’s 
practice of searching individuals without a warrant by way of 
transporting suspected terrorists15 on military ships through 
international waters is in direct conflict with the Fourth16 
Amendment.17 On its face, this practice appears to comply with 
                                                 
regulations ensuring that the U.S. Navy, among others, does not directly participate 
in civilian law enforcement absent authorization by law). The Department of 
Justice maintains the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply outside of the territory of 
the United States, and as such, for the purposes of this article, it will be assumed 
that the United States Government’s practice of using military vessels in a law 
enforcement capacity for suspects bound for civilian courts is itself legal. See Int’l 
Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The Commanders 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.3.1, p. 3-13 (2007). 
13 See Evan Perez and Holly Yan, Controversy Swirls Over Handling Of Benghazi 
Suspect Abu Khatallah, CNN, June 29, 2014 (Ahmed Abu Khatallah questioned 
aboard ship for two weeks). 
14 See Michael Schmidt, Matt Apuzzo, Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage, Trial 
Secondary As U.S. Questions a Libyan Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014. 
15 Ahmed Abu Khatallah is not the first suspected terrorist held aboard 
military vessels pending transfer to the United States. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests 
New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011 
(describing the handling of Somali Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame aboard the USS 
Boxer); Benjamin Weiser and Eric Schmitt, U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy 
Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013 (Libyan Abu Anas al-Libi aboard the USS San 
Antonio). 
16 The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
17 Again, recognizing that contravention of the Fourth Amendment is likely 
only a collateral benefit and not the official reasoning for the use of military ships 
to transport suspected terrorists, see Note 11 supra. Additionally, this discussion will 
be limited to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Abu Khatallah, as well 
as similarly situated suspected terrorists. Questions surrounding Miranda and the 
Public Safety Exception, while extremely important and relevant to Abu Khatallah, 
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numerous Supreme Court cases establishing the extraterritorial reach 
of the Fourth Amendment.18 However, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Boumediene v. Bush19 raises questions regarding the applicability of 
the Fourth Amendment on a United States military vessel, even if the 
ship is located in international waters.  
To answer these questions, it is necessary to first understand 
the extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution. Part II of this 
article will describe the extraterritoriality of the United States 
Constitution. Part III will explore the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Boumediene and its impact on the extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution. Part IV will examine the United States’ position on the 
jurisdiction surrounding American military vessels. Part V discusses a 
few policy considerations implicated by the analysis of Parts II-IV.  
II.  THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
The extraterritoriality of the Constitution can be broken 
down as it applies to three main categories of individuals: (1) non-
United States citizens present within the territory of the United 
States, (2) United States citizens outside of the territory of the United 
States, and (3) non-United States citizens outside of the territory of 
the United States.  
Section A will give a brief overview of the applicability of the 
Constitution to the first two categories, non-United States citizens 
within the United States and United States citizens abroad. Section B 
will give a more in-depth look at the category in which Ahmed Abu 
                                                 
as well as other similarly situated suspected terrorists, are too much to address here 
and will be saved for another time. 
18 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to foreign citizens in foreign territories); INS V. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (assuming illegal aliens in the United States 
have Fourth Amendment rights); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitutional 
provisions applicable to United States citizens abroad); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763 (1950) (no extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment). 
19 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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Khatallah falls, a non-United States citizen located outside of the 
United States. 
A.  Applicability to non-United States Citizens within the United 
States, and United States Citizens Abroad. 
In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,20 the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether a Chinese national lawfully living in the United 
States could be detained without first receiving notice of the charges 
levied against him, while further denying the individual any 
opportunity to voice their opposition to the detention.21 The 
Supreme Court held that non-United States citizens present within 
the United States are afforded constitutional protections.22 In 
deciding the case, the Court stated the “well-established” principle 
that, if an alien is lawfully present in the United States, he is within 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment and may not be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process.23  
The Supreme Court first addressed whether the Constitution, 
and more specifically the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, apply to 
United States citizens outside of the United States in Reid v. Covert.24 
In Reid, the Court addressed the issue of whether military trials of 
civilian spouses of servicemen stationed abroad were constitutional.25 
Upon rehearing and reconsideration, the Supreme Court reversed 
their earlier decision26 and held that civilian spouses of servicemen 
                                                 
20 344 U.S. 590 (1953). 
21 Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 595. 
22 Id. at 600. 
23 Id. at 596. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., 
concurring) (“Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our 
borders.); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-771 (1950) (Mere lawful 
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him 
certain rights.). 
24 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
25 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5. 
26 See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 487 (1956) (holding that Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments do not protect American citizens tried by the American 
Government for crimes committed and tried in a foreign land). 
DOCUMENT4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
244 
stationed abroad could not be tried by a military tribunal.27 Trying a 
civilian in a military tribunal was held to be in violation of the 
civilian’s Fifth28 and Sixth29 Amendment rights.30   
The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the United States’ 
power and authority is solely created by the Constitution, the 
Government must act within constitutional limitations.31  The Court 
rejected the argument that only fundamental constitutional rights 
protect Americans abroad.32 Instead, the Court found in favor of 
extending every provision of the Constitution to American citizens, 
either at home or in another land.33  
Kwong Hai Chew and Reid thus begin to define the breadth and 
limits of constitutional applicability. Instead of universal applicability, 
the Constitution applies to United States citizens, in the United States 
as well as abroad, and to foreign nationals that are lawfully within the 
territory of the United States. However, one question remains: do the 
provisions of the Constitution restrain the United States when it acts 
against a foreign national outside of the territory of the United 
                                                 
27 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5. 
28 The Fifth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “No person shall be held 
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger... nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 
amend. V. 
29 The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
30 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.  
31 Id. at 6 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-180 (1803)). 
32 Reid, 354 U.S. at 9. 
33 Id. at 9. However, courts have since limited the extent to which some 
constitutional provisions apply to citizens outside of the United States. See e.g., In re 
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2nd Cir. 2008) (holding that “the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted abroad by 
U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.”). 
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States? The Supreme Court first addressed this question in United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.34   
B.  Applicability to non-United States Citizens Outside the United 
States. 
For decades, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Verdugo has stood as the guidepost for determining whether foreign 
citizens located outside of the United States have rights under the 
United States Constitution. In Verdugo, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was violated 
when Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents searched the 
defendant’s house without a search warrant.35 The Court ultimately 
held that because the defendant was a Mexican national, and the 
property searched was located in Mexico, the Fourth Amendment did 
not apply.36  
The defendant in Verdugo, a citizen and resident of Mexico, 
was apprehended by Mexican authorities based on an American 
arrest warrant issued in connection with narcotics distribution.37 The 
Mexican citizen was transported to the Mexican-American border 
where he was delivered to United States Marshals for arrest.38 
Following the arrest, DEA agents, in conjunction with Mexican 
Federal Judicial Police Officers searched the defendant’s properties in 
Mexicali and San Felipe and seized evidence of the defendant’s 
narcotics trafficking.39   
At trial, the District Court for the Southern District of 
California suppressed the seized evidence, concluding that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to the search and that there had been no 
justification for searching the premises without a warrant.40 The 
                                                 
34 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
35 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 261. 
36 Id. at 274-75. 
37 Id. at 262. 
38 Id. 
39 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 262. 
40 Id. at 263. 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, although divided, affirmed 
the District Court’s ruling by relying on Reid.41 On further appeal, in a 
6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
did not apply to the defendant because at the time of the search, the 
defendant “was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary 
attachment to the United States, and the place searched was located 
in Mexico.”42  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority opinion, 
examined the function of the Fourth Amendment compared to the 
Fifth Amendment, which was at issue in Reid.43 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that while constitutional violations of the Fifth 
Amendment occur at trial, violations of the Fourth Amendment are 
“fully accomplished” at the time of the search.44 Therefore, even if 
there was a constitutional violation of the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, it occurred solely in Mexico.45 Remedial exclusion 
of the evidence is a separate question and does not touch on the 
existence of a constitutional violation in and of itself.46  
The Chief Justice, in an effort to determine whether the 
Fourth Amendment was meant to apply to foreign nationals, 
analyzed the language and history of the Fourth Amendment.47 First, 
the language of the Fourth Amendment, using the term of art ‘the 
people,’ refers to “a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection 
with this country to be considered part of that community.”48   
Second, the history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that 
its provisions were meant to protect the American people against 
arbitrary action by the United States Government, and not intended 
to restrain the actions of the United States Government against aliens 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 274-75. 
43 Id. at 264. 
44 Id.  
45 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 265. 
48 Id.  
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outside American territory.49 As an example, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted that in 1798 Congress passed an act allowing commanders of 
both public and private armed vessels of the United States to 
“subdue, seize and take any armed French vessel . . . on the high 
seas.”50 While some commanders were held liable for seizures beyond 
the scope of Congress’ grant of authority,51 the Supreme Court never 
suggested the Fourth Amendment restrained commanders from 
conducting such seizures authorized by Congress.52  
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked at previous case law to 
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the DEA 
search conducted in Mexico.53 The opinion in Verdugo stated that the 
Court of Appeals’ global application of the Constitution goes against 
precedential cases, known as the Insular Cases.54 As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist points out, the Insular Cases55 held that not every 
constitutional provision applies to Government activity, even when 
the United States may have sovereign power, and that only 
fundamental constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of 
unincorporated territories of the United States.56 Because the 
Constitution “does not, without legislation and of its own force” 
apply to territories ultimately governed by Congress, the claim that 
                                                 
49 Id. at 266. 
50 Id. at 267. See also §§ 1-2 of An Act Further to Protect the Commerce of 
the United States, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578-9. 
51 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 177-178 (1804); cf. Talbot v. 
Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 31 (1801) (seizure of neutral ship lawful where American 
captain had probable cause to believe vessel was French). 
52 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 
91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines); 
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in 
Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (jury trial and indictment by 
grand jury provisions inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901) (Revenue Clauses inapplicable to Puerto Rico). 
56 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148). 
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protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in foreign 
nations is especially weak.57   
In addition to the Insular Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist found 
support for holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
foreign nationals in foreign territories in Johnson v. Eisentrager.58 The 
Chief Justice emphasized that while some constitutional provisions 
extend beyond the citizenry of the United States, the Eisentrager 
opinion emphatically rejected the extraterritorial application of the 
Fifth Amendment, as the extraterritorial application of organic law is 
a practice that every modern government is opposed to.59  
In contrast to the Insular Cases and Eisentrager, the Chief 
Justice distinguished Verdugo from the Reid decision relied on by the 
lower courts.60 In quoting from the Reid decision, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist emphasized that, “when the government reaches out to 
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and 
other parts of the Constitution provided to protect his life and liberty 
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another 
land.”61 While the lower courts interpreted such language as 
constraining federal officials under the Fourth Amendment wherever 
and against whomever they act, the Chief Justice stated that Reid dealt 
with United States citizens abroad and that the holding of Reid is 
therefore not applicable to the case at hand.62  
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly rejected the contention that 
case law dealing with the application of the Constitution to foreign 
nationals within the United States63 applies to the case at hand 
because the defendant in Verdugo had no voluntary connection with 
the United States, and foreign nationals can only avail themselves of 
                                                 
57 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149). 
58 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (rejecting the claim that enemy aliens imprisoned in 
Germany after World War II are entitled to habeas corpus writs in federal courts 
on the ground that their war crimes convictions were violations of the Fifth 
Amendment and other constitutional provisions). 
59 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784). 
60 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270. 
61 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6). 
62 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270. 
63 See Kwong Hai Chew, supra note 21. 
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the protections of the Constitution when they come within the 
territory of, and develop substantial connections with, the United 
States.64 In response to Justice Stevens’ concurrence,65 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
should not turn on the “fortuitous circumstance” that the foreign 
national had been transported to the United States prior to the 
search. Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that only voluntary 
presence in the United States invokes constitutional protections for 
foreign nationals.66  
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted that in addition to 
the reasoning of the Chief Justice, practicality concerns also weigh in 
favor of the Fourth Amendment not having any application to 
searches of foreign nationals in foreign territories.67 Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that due to the absence of local magistrates or judges in 
foreign territories that have the authority or ability to issue American 
search warrants, as well as the “differing and perhaps unascertainable 
conceptions of reasonableness” in foreign territories, the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment should not apply in foreign 
territories as it does in the United States.68 Likewise, Justice Stevens 
concurred with the majority opinion that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply, primarily because American magistrates have no 
authority to authorize searches in foreign territories.69  
                                                 
64 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 271. (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) 
(“The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are universal in their application, 
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction…”) (emphasis in original); Kwong Hai Chew, 
344 U.S. at 596(“But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our 
borders”) (emphasis in original)). 
65 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that aliens lawfully present in 
the United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether 
they are present voluntarily or, as in the case at hand, involuntarily. Verdugo, 494 
U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
66 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 272. However, the voluntary presence standard failed 
to gain acceptance by a majority of the Court and is therefore dicta. 
67 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
68 Id. Additionally, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed that the Warrant 
Clause does not apply and searches conducted abroad are subject only to the 
reasonable aspect of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
69 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
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Applying the Supreme Court’s previous analyses of the scope 
of the Constitution to the Government’s actions in dealing with 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah, it seems that the Constitutional protections 
of the Fourth Amendment do not apply. First, Abu Khatallah is not a 
citizen of the United States, and therefore cannot avail himself of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections on the grounds of citizenship. 
Second, the search of Abu Khatallah did not occur in the territory of 
the United States, but rather occurred in international waters, 
eliminating the protections of the Fourth Amendment afforded non-
citizens within the United States. Lastly, while an argument can be 
made that Abu Khatallah was in the possession of the United States 
when he was searched, the Chief Justice’s “voluntary connection” 
language from Verdugo suggests that because Abu Khatallah had no 
connection to the United States other than his capture and 
subsequent rendition to justice, which is most certainly not a 
voluntary connection, the Fourth Amendment does not apply.  
Following the Verdugo holding, the United States could have 
viably searched, without a search warrant, not only Abu Khatallah’s 
physical person in international waters, but also any properties owned 
by Abu Khatallah outside of the United States (i.e., his house in 
Libya). However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush 
raises questions as to whether the Constitution in fact does apply to 
Abu Khattallah, and whether the Government’s search of Abu 
Khatallah was legal. 
III.  BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH AND DE FACTO JURISDICTION 
THROUGH EXCLUSIVE CONTROL 
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court dealt with several issues 
revolving around foreign national enemy combatants held at 
Guantanamo Bay.70 Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay could avail 
themselves of the constitutional protection of the Writ of Habeas 
                                                 
70 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732. 
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Corpus.71 The Supreme Court in Boumediene denied the Government’s 
argument that the foreign nationals were held in territory outside of 
the Nation’s borders, which therefore leaves the detainees without 
constitutional rights,72 and concluded that foreign nationals detained 
as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay may invoke the 
protections of habeas corpus.73 In doing so, the Supreme Court 
created a functional test to determine the extraterritorial reach of the 
Constitution.74  
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that 
pursuant to the agreement between Cuba and the United States, Cuba 
retains “ultimate sovereignty,” while the United States exercises 
“complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay.75 Because 
of this division of power, Justice Kennedy stressed that while Cuba 
has de jure jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, the United States 
nonetheless has de facto jurisdiction.76 This distinction ultimately lead 
Justice Kennedy to conclude that “[i]n every practical sense 
Guantanamo [Bay] is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction 
of the United States.”77 Because of the “complete and total control” 
of the United States over Guantanamo Bay, foreign detainees held 
there could avail themselves of the constitutional protections of 
habeas corpus.78  
Justice Kennedy found support for the holding in the lack of 
prudential concerns previously preventing the extension of habeas 
corpus to territories under the sovereign control of a different 
nation.79 Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that there was no reason 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 739. 
73 Id. at 798. 
74 Id. at 764. 
75 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753. See also Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval 
Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, T.S. No. 418. 
76 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755. 
77 Id. at 769. 
78 Id. at 771. 
79 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751. See generally King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834 (As a 
territory that was not a part of England, yet controlled by the English monarch, the 
writ of habeas corpus was never extended to Scotland); R. Sharpe, The Law of 
Habeas Corpus 191 (2d ed. 1989). See also Note on the Power of English Courts to 
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to believe that a federal court’s order would be disobeyed at 
Guantanamo Bay, and that no other law besides that of the United 
States applies to the naval base.80  
Additionally, Justice Kennedy attempted to reconcile his 
functional holding with previous case law. First, in addressing the 
Insular cases, Justice Kennedy found that by utilizing the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation,81 the Court devised a functional approach to 
the application of the Constitution.82 This approach served as a 
foundation to the functional approach established by the Supreme 
Court in Boumediene.83  
Second, Justice Kennedy found support for his holding in the 
practical concerns that influenced the Court in Reid.84 Justice 
Kennedy read Reid to rely not on the citizenship of the petitioners, 
but instead on the petitioner’s place of confinement and trial.85 
Relying primarily on Justice Frankfurter’s and Justice Harlan’s 
concurrences in Reid, Justice Kennedy noted that Reid rejected a rigid 
rule in favor of analyzing the circumstances of each particular case 
when applying the Constitution extraterritorially.86  
                                                 
Issue the Writ of Habeas to Places Within the Dominions of the Crown, But Out 
of England, and On the Position of Scotland in Relation to that Power, 8 Jurid. 
Rev. 158 (1896). 
80 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751. 
81 Under the doctrine of territorial incorporation, utilized in the Insular cases, 
the Constitution is fully incorporated and applies only to territories destined for 
statehood. For unincorporated territories (those not destined for statehood) the 
Constitution only applies in part, determined by the situation of the territory and its 
relationship to the United States. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143. 
82 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759. See also Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312. 
83 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764. 
84 Id. at 759. 
85 Id. at 760. 
86 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768. In his concurrence to Reid Justice Harlan 
rejected a “rigid and abstract rule,” reading the Insular cases to mean that 
constitutional provisions’ extraterritorial effect depends on the particular 
circumstances, particularly whether judicial enforcement would be “impracticable 
and anomalous.” Reid, 351 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). See also 
Reid, 351 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). 
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Lastly, to reconcile his holding with the holding of Eisentrager, 
Justice Kennedy distinguished Landsberg prison from Guantanamo 
Bay on the basis that, while both are located outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States, Guantanamo Bay is under the exclusive 
control of the United States, whereas Landsberg prison was under 
the control of the combined Allied Forces.87 In an attempt at further 
reconciliation, Justice Kennedy noted that nothing in Eisentrager 
stated that de jure sovereignty has ever been the only consideration in 
determining the reach of the Constitution.88 Justice Kennedy thus 
concluded that “a common thread” used to determine “questions of 
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not 
formalism[,]” and thus unites the Insular cases, Eisentrager, and Reid.89  
However, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in 
Boumediene, the majority completely missed the mark with Eisentrager, 
which “conclusively establishes the opposite” of a functional test for 
extraterritoriality.90 Quoting Justice Jackson in Eisentrager, Justice 
Scalia noted, “in extending constitutional protections beyond the 
citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the 
alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the judiciary 
power to act.”91 From the language in Eisentrager, Justice Scalia 
concluded that Eisentrager “held beyond any doubt - that the 
Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United 
States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”92  
The Insular cases, Reid, and Eisentrager, do in fact stand for the 
same idea, as observed by the majority. However, the majority 
interpreted these cases incorrectly. Instead of standing for a 
functional approach to extraterritoriality, Justice Scalia pointed out 
that, like Eisentrager, the Insular cases stand for the proposition that 
aliens outside of United States sovereign territory do not have 
                                                 
87 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 768. The United States was therefore “answerable 
to its Allies” for all activities occurring at Landsberg prison. Id. 
88 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. at 770-71). 
92 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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constitutional rights.93 Quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico,94 Justice Scalia 
stated that, “The Constitution of the United States is in force in 
Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that 
government is exerted.”95 Moreover, all of the Justices of the Reid 
majority, save one, limited their analysis to the rights of citizens 
abroad.96   
The Insular cases dealt with territory that was a part of the 
United States’ sovereign territory,97 the Reid Court addressed the 
rights of citizens abroad, and Eisentrager specifically declined to 
extend constitutional privileges to foreign nationals outside of United 
States sovereign territory. Functional approach or not, the idea that 
the Constitution applies to foreign nationals outside of the United 
States’ sovereignty can not be found in any of the Supreme Court’s 
previous opinions. Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s ultimate holding in 
Boumediene, Justice Frankfurter stated in his concurrence that, while 
the “deck of a private American vessel . . . is considered for many 
purposes constructively as territory of the United States . . . persons 
on board such vessels . . . cannot invoke the protection of the 
provisions [of the Constitution] until brought within the actual 
territorial boundaries of the United States.”98 Thus, the functional de 
jure versus de facto sovereignty approach adopted by the majority in 
Boumediene is not only judicially created, but is a blatant 
misconstruction and revision of the Court’s previous case law in a 
weak attempt at justification. 
                                                 
93 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94 258 U.S. 298 (1922). Justice Kennedy cited this case in concluding that 
the Insular Cases created a functional test for the application of the Constitution to 
American territories. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758. 
95 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Balzac v. Porto 
Rico, 258 U.S. at 312.) (emphasis added). 
96 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 
(plurality opinion of Black, J., Harlan, J., and Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). 
Justice Frankfurter was the only Justice in the majority that did not limit the 
analysis to American citizens abroad. However, Justice Frankfurter went a step 
further and limited his analysis to civilian dependents of American military abroad, 
an even narrower class. 
97 See Boumediene, 553. U.S. at 839; Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268; Reid, 354 U.S. at 
13 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). 
98 Reid, 354 U.S. at 55-6. (quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). 
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Although Boumediene seems to have rewritten the Insular cases, 
Reid, and Eisentrager, and did not overrule Verdugo despite being in 
direct contradiction to it, it is still controlling law. Therefore, there is 
a rather gray area of law regarding the application of the Constitution 
to foreign national terror suspects held aboard American military 
vessels that are located in international waters. Under Eisentrager and 
Verdugo, the Fourth Amendment would not apply to the search of a 
foreign-national terrorism suspect, so long as the search occurs 
outside of the territory of the United States, where the United States 
lacks de jure sovereignty. Under Boumediene, however, the Fourth 
Amendment seemingly applies to a search of such foreign-national 
terrorism suspects if conducted within an area where the United 
States exercises de facto sovereignty through ‘complete and total 
control,’ in addition to searches conducted within the de jure 
sovereignty of the United States. While the Eisentrager/Verdugo and 
Boumediene rules may lead to the same result in some cases, such as if a 
search of a foreign-national terrorism suspect occurred within the 
sovereign territory of the United States, the same cannot be said 
when the search is conducted where the United States only exercises 
de facto, and not de jure sovereignty. 
Such a situation is in fact presented by the handling of 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah by the United States Government. By 
searching Abu Khatallah on a military vessel in international waters, 
the United States searched Abu Khatallah in a location where the 
country certainly lacks de jure jurisdiction (by virtue of being in 
international waters), yet arguably exercises de facto jurisdiction (by 
virtue of being on an American military vessel). Applying the 
Boumediene holding to the actions of the Government in dealing with 
Abu Khatallah, his search would not be legal, absent a warrant, if the 
military vessel on which the search occurred can be equated to being 
under de facto sovereignty of the United States. 
One significant question thus arises: was Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah within the ‘complete and total control’ of the United States 
when he was searched while being held on the American military ship 
in international waters? The answer to this question may dictate not 
only the legality of the Government’s actions with Abu Khatallah, 
but also may impact the future course of conduct of the United 
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States in dealing with similarly-situated terrorism suspects that have 
been captured. 
IV.  DOES THE UNITED STATES EXERCISE DE FACTO 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN 
INTERNATIONAL WATERS? 
In determining whether an American military vessel in 
international waters is equivalent to Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene 
purposes, several sources may help shed light on how the vessel 
should be treated. One such source is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.99  
Designed to define the rights and responsibilities of nations 
regarding the world’s oceans, the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
states that, “[s]hips have the nationality of the State whose flag they 
are entitled to fly,”100 and that, “ships shall sail under the flag of one 
State only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas.”101 Additionally, the Convention goes further in specifying 
that warships on the high seas “have complete immunity from the 
jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.”102 Lastly, the 
Convention mandates that every State shall “assume jurisdiction 
under its internal law over each ship flying its flag.”103  
Following the language in the Convention of the Law of the 
Sea and the rule laid down in Boumediene, a search of Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah aboard an American military ship in international waters 
would be subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                 
99 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 243. 
100 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 91, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
101 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
102 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 95, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
103 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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Because he was searched on an American military vessel, the ship 
carries the nationality of the United States and is subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The “internal law” that the 
Convention subjects the ship to as an American vessel most certainly 
refers to the United States Constitution, including the provisions of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
The provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea do 
not bind the United States because the United States has not become 
a signatory party to the Convention.104 However, customary 
international law echoes the rule eventually adopted by the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Predating the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated 
in The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey)105 [hereinafter “the Lotus 
case”], “a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the 
State the flag of which it flies.”106 Furthermore, the Lotus case points 
out that “a ship is placed in the same position as national territory,” 
and that “what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be 
regarded as if it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the 
ship flies.”107  
While the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea may not 
bind the United States, the Lotus case does bind the United States 
absent conflicting domestic law.108 Because neither Congress nor 
                                                 
104 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & 
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 163 (2014). But see Id. at n. 
13 (describing support for US ratification, including support from former 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush). 
105 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 
(Sept. 7). 
106 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 
¶ 65 (Sept. 7). 
107 Id. 
108 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary 
international law is binding on the United States in the absence of conflicting 
domestic law). On the other hand, courts have held that customary international 
law is not controlling where Congress has specifically enacted a law on the issue. See 
Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other 
grounds, 946 F.2d 1481 (1991) (holding that the customary norm of safe haven in 
times of civil war was preempted by the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 and 
the executive act of voluntary departure). 
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courts have directly dealt with the territorial characteristics of military 
vessels, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations is perhaps the most important tool in analyzing the way 
the United States Government views its military vessels, as well as the 
jurisdictional laws surrounding them. It is therefore helpful in 
determining whether an American military vessel can be equated to 
Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene purposes of applying the 
Constitution to foreign nationals. 
According to the Commander’s Handbook, which provides 
guidance for American military officers “on the rules of law 
governing naval operations in peacetime and during armed 
conflict,”109 United States Naval policy requires warships to assert the 
rights of sovereign immunity.110 The privilege of sovereign immunity 
entitles all U.S. warships and United States ships (USS) to “exclusive 
control over persons onboard such vessels with respect to acts 
performed onboard.”111 More importantly, the Commander’s 
Handbook states, “U.S. law applies at all times aboard U.S. vessels as 
the law of the flag nation and is enforceable on U.S. vessels . . . 
anywhere in the world.”112  
Similar to the Commander’s Handbook, the Judge Advocate 
General’s Operational Law Handbook, which acts as a “how to” 
guide for military lawyers113 declares that state craft, including 
warships, are “absolutely immune on the high seas.”114  
                                                 
109 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, p. 3 (2007). 
110 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.2.2, p. 2-2 (2007). 
111 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.1, p. 2-1 (2007). 
112 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.2.1, p. 3-10 
(2007). 
113 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & 
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. i (2014). 
114 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & 
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 174 (2014) (citing article 
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Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law 
Handbook strongly suggest that American military ships in 
international waters are essentially United States territory abroad, and 
certainly under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United 
States. Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law 
Handbook thus can be said to equate an American military ship in 
international waters to Guantanamo Bay, for de facto jurisdictional 
purposes. Similar to the Boumediene reasoning of “complete and total 
control” that the United States holds over Guantanamo Bay, the 
Commander’s Handbook gives the United States “exclusive control” 
over military vessels such as the one used to transport Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah. 
Moreover, the Commander’s Handbook specifically states 
that U.S. law applies at all times on American flagged vessels. Surely, 
U.S. law refers to the whole Constitution including the Fourth 
Amendment. Therefore, the United States Government must abide 
by the Fourth Amendment when it searches terrorism suspects like 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah aboard an American military vessel, even if 
the vessel is located in international waters. 
V.  RAMIFICATIONS OF EXTENDING FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS HELD ABOARD 
AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. 
The practice of extending the provisions of the Fourth 
Amendment to foreign nationals held aboard an American military 
vessel in international waters raises several important policy 
considerations. Firstly, who has the jurisdiction to issue warrants for 
such searches? Could any federal judge in the United States issue 
such a warrant? Or would it be limited to judges within a certain 
jurisdiction? And if so, which jurisdiction? Similarly, what court can 
hear challenges to such warrants? Would it be the district court to 
which the suspect is ultimately brought? Or would it be a special 
court created specifically for such purposes? 
                                                 
95 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea). See also Id. at 171 (providing complete 
sovereign immunity for State vessels). 
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The second policy consideration implicated by such a 
decision is what effect that decision will have on future dealings with 
captured terrorism suspects. The United States can easily defeat 
having to grant the protections of the Fourth Amendment to a 
foreign suspect by delaying the suspect from reaching an American 
vessel. Capturing forces could take the time to search and interrogate 
the suspect in the nation where the capture takes place before 
transporting the suspect back to the United States. However, this 
would result in added delay, and most likely added risk for both the 
capturing forces and the captured suspect, who would have to spend 
more time in a likely hostile environment. The consequences of 
extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to foreign 
suspects aboard American ships in international waters could 
therefore result in a failure to even prevent a search of the suspect 
without a warrant, while at the same time place American citizens, 
and even the foreign suspect himself, at greater harm. 
A third important policy consideration is the likelihood of 
compliance with such a rule. Compliance with such a rule ultimately 
relies on whether the information resulting from a search would later 
be used or excluded from the trial of the captured terrorism suspect. 
Exclusion of ill-gotten information would most likely help ensure 
compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
However, if the Government already has a strong enough case (and if 
the Government is going to exercise its rendition powers, it likely has 
a strong enough case already) then exclusion of the information 
resulting from the search would not be of much consequence. 
Searches would be conducted more for intelligence value rather than 
evidentiary value during a subsequent prosecution, and the threat of 
future exclusion of information gained would therefore not stop 
searches when a warrant is unable to be obtained. The rule requiring 
a warrant would thus prove toothless, all the while unnecessarily 
restricting the later prosecution of the captured suspect. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While the history of decisions regarding the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution, from Eisentrager to Verdugo, seems to 
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suggest that the United States Government’s search of Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah aboard a ship in international waters is legal, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Boumediene challenges that theory.  
Following the Verdugo holding and Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence in Reid, the Fourth Amendment would not be applicable 
to foreign nationals held aboard American ships in international 
waters. However, following the more recent Boumediene holding, 
because the American military vessel on which he was searched is 
subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States, 
despite being in international waters and outside United States 
territory, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would seemingly 
extend to Abu Khatallah just as the protections of a habeas corpus 
petition extended to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in 
Boumediene. In other words, the Fourth Amendment would protect 
Abu Khatallah because an American military ship in international 
waters is “not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the 
United States.”115  
Regardless of the lack of value and heavy burden produced 
by such a rule, in light of Boumediene, the Fourth Amendment, as well 
as the rest of the Constitution, likely applies to foreign terrorism 
suspects held aboard American military vessels, even if the ships are 
located in international waters. This unintended consequence of the 
Boumediene decision leaves the United States Government operating in 
a dubious zone of legality when it searches terrorist suspects aboard 
military vessels absent a warrant, and may ultimately necessitate a 
change in the way the United States deals with captured terrorism 
suspects in the future. 
 
                                                 
115 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 at 769; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 
(2004). 
